The wind farm at Možura, located near Ulcinj, has become one of the most polarising infrastructure projects in Montenegro’s recent economic history—simultaneously cited as a renewable energy success story and a case study in governance failure and financial opacity.
At a technical and energy-system level, the project delivers measurable value. Commissioned in 2019, the 46 MW wind park, consisting of 23 turbines, generates approximately 120 GWh annually, contributing to Montenegro’s renewable portfolio and reducing reliance on imported electricity. This output places Možura among the country’s more significant non-hydro renewable assets, supporting EU-aligned decarbonisation targets and long-term energy diversification.
The investment itself, estimated at around €90 million, was structured through a consortium involving Malta’s state utility Enemalta and partners linked to international engineering contractors, including Chinese EPC participation. From a purely operational perspective, the plant performs its intended function: generating stable renewable output with predictable capacity factors typical for coastal Adriatic wind corridors.
Yet the economic narrative diverges sharply when examining how the project was developed, financed, and transferred.
Investigations and political scrutiny have repeatedly highlighted a chain of transactions that significantly inflated costs and redistributed value away from the Montenegrin state. The core controversy stems from the resale of the project concession: an offshore intermediary acquired the asset for approximately €2.9 million, only to sell it shortly afterward for around €10.3 million, generating substantial intermediary profit without adding tangible value.
This transaction structure, combined with limited due diligence and opaque ownership layers, has been widely cited as evidence of systemic weaknesses in project governance. Subsequent audits suggested that the acquiring party was aware it was paying an inflated price, raising further concerns about fiduciary oversight.
The financial implications extend beyond the initial acquisition. Montenegro committed to a subsidised electricity purchase framework, with estimates indicating up to €115 million in support mechanisms over 12 years, effectively transferring long-term cost burdens to consumers through electricity tariffs. This subsidy structure, typical for early-stage renewable deployment, becomes significantly more controversial when layered onto a project already marked by inflated entry costs.
More recent findings have intensified scrutiny. Government representatives have pointed to potential tax losses exceeding €12 million, linked to complex financial transactions involving intermediary firms with no operational footprint, including equipment trades valued at around €40 million executed under questionable circumstances. These structures were allegedly used to optimise VAT positions and inject liquidity into the project through non-transparent channels.
Beyond financial engineering, the Možura case has taken on geopolitical and reputational dimensions. The project has been referenced in international corruption investigations, including those connected to Malta and the broader network of offshore entities involved in energy transactions. The case also intersected with the work of investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, further amplifying its international visibility and sensitivity.
For Montenegro, the consequences extend into EU accession dynamics. European institutions have explicitly called for a credible and independent investigation into the project, framing it as a test of rule-of-law capacity and institutional maturity. This places Možura not only in the energy policy domain, but at the center of broader governance benchmarks tied to EU integration.
Despite these controversies, the asset retains long-term strategic value. Under the concession framework, the wind farm is expected to transfer into full state ownership by 2035, effectively converting it into a public asset after the expiration of the lease period. This future ownership shift partially offsets earlier financial inefficiencies, particularly if the plant continues to operate reliably and if electricity prices remain structurally elevated across the region.
The duality of Možura—functioning asset versus flawed transaction—captures a broader pattern seen across early renewable investments in emerging European markets. On one side, the project contributes to decarbonisation, grid stability, and alignment with EU energy policy. On the other, it exposes the cost of weak procurement frameworks, insufficient due diligence, and politically exposed deal structures.
In practical terms, the question of whether Možura represents a “loss” or a “benefit” depends on the analytical lens applied. From an energy systems perspective, it is clearly a productive asset. From a fiscal and governance standpoint, it reflects a case where value leakage during development phases significantly diluted national economic returns.
What remains unresolved is the full quantification of that leakage—and whether institutional reforms currently underway in Montenegro are sufficient to prevent similar outcomes in the next wave of renewable and infrastructure investments.
