Montenegro’s ambition to enter the European Union by 2028 is no longer only a diplomatic timetable. It is becoming a test of whether the country can turn legal alignment, institutional reform and political consensus into a stronger private-sector economy. That is the sharper message behind the warning from Branko Mitrović, president of the Foreign Investors Council, who argues that EU accession will not be the end of Montenegro’s reform cycle, but the beginning of a more demanding competition for capital, productivity and investor confidence.
The core number is uncomfortable. Montenegro’s gross domestic product per capita, measured in purchasing power standards, stands at roughly 54% of the EU average. In practical terms, that means the country cannot converge with Europe through accession mechanics alone. It needs a broader expansion of productive activity, a deeper corporate base and a faster removal of administrative barriers that still slow investment decisions, project implementation and business scaling.
Mitrović’s argument is direct: Montenegro must find a way to almost double the scale of its economic activity if it wants to move towards the EU average. That does not mean simply adding more consumption, more seasonal tourism revenue or more real-estate inflows. It means building a business environment capable of supporting higher-value services, infrastructure concessions, energy investment, export-oriented companies, digitalisation, industrial upgrading and a more predictable regulatory system.
The statement lands at a politically sensitive moment. Montenegro has positioned itself as the frontrunner in the EU enlargement process and has tied much of its international narrative to the “28 by 2028” ambition. Recent progress in closing accession chapters has reinforced that momentum. But the closer the country moves to membership, the more visible the economic gap becomes. A small economy can move quickly on legal chapters, but convergence with the EU average requires capital formation, institutional capacity and productivity growth over several years.
The Foreign Investors Council has a particular weight in this debate because its members are not peripheral players. International companies operating in Montenegro generate around 21% of national GDP and employ almost 6,000 people. Their role is therefore larger than a standard business association. They are already a measurable part of Montenegro’s economic base, and their assessment of administrative bottlenecks, regulatory predictability and investment risk carries direct relevance for the country’s growth model.
Montenegro’s official GDP reached €7.645bn in 2024, with real growth of 3.2%. That remains a respectable post-pandemic performance, but it is not enough to close the gap with the EU at the speed implied by the political calendar. The IMF projects growth around the low 3% range over the medium term, with inflation and fiscal pressures still requiring careful management. This is where Mitrović’s message becomes more than a business complaint. Montenegro needs faster reform because its current growth rate is not structurally strong enough to deliver rapid convergence on its own.
The business barriers cited by investors are familiar across the Western Balkans: slow permits, uneven implementation of rules, administrative discretion, inconsistent interpretation of laws, delays in public procedures, weak coordination between institutions and insufficient digitalisation of public services. In Montenegro’s case, these issues matter even more because the country’s domestic market is small. Investors do not have the cushion of scale. Delays, legal uncertainty or unclear procedures can quickly change the economics of a project.
The challenge is not simply to attract new foreign investors, but to retain and expand the ones already present. Existing international companies are often the easiest source of new investment because they know the market, have local teams and can scale if the operating environment becomes more predictable. For Montenegro, this means that reform should not be measured only by laws adopted in parliament, but by whether companies can obtain permits faster, resolve disputes within reasonable timeframes, connect infrastructure, hire skilled staff and plan capital expenditure with confidence.
EU accession can help, but it cannot substitute for execution. Membership will open a larger institutional and market framework, but investors will still price Montenegro according to risk, capacity and delivery. The country’s small size can be an advantage only if it becomes administratively agile. If procedures remain slow, the same smallness becomes a constraint, pushing investors towards larger neighbouring markets or EU member states with clearer implementation records.
The most important economic shift would be from a consumption-heavy, tourism-sensitive model towards a more diversified investment base. Tourism, real estate and services will remain central, but Montenegro’s next growth phase needs more energy infrastructure, logistics, airport modernisation, digital services, green transition projects, industrial support services and higher-value business platforms linked to the EU market. These areas require long-term capital, and long-term capital requires trust in institutions.
That is why the removal of barriers is not a technical issue. It is a convergence strategy. Faster permitting, cleaner public administration, better dispute resolution and stronger regulatory discipline would directly affect Montenegro’s cost of capital. Banks, infrastructure investors, energy developers and strategic corporate investors all price uncertainty. Every unresolved administrative delay becomes a hidden tax on growth.
Montenegro’s EU path has already created political visibility. The harder task now is to convert that visibility into bankable reform. The country can present itself as the next EU member, but investors will judge whether it behaves like a near-member state in daily business practice. That means transparent public procedures, predictable taxation, professional regulation, digital public services and institutions that can implement decisions at the same pace at which political promises are made.
Mitrović’s warning should therefore be read as a growth agenda, not as criticism from the sidelines. If Montenegro wants to approach the EU average, it needs to treat the business environment as part of the accession process itself. The next phase will not be won only in Brussels, but in municipal offices, ministries, courts, regulators, grid-connection procedures, concession tenders and the everyday administrative machinery that determines whether capital enters, waits or leaves.
EU membership may give Montenegro the historic opening it has been seeking. The economic result will depend on whether the country uses the remaining pre-accession period to make investment easier, faster and more credible. The figure of 54% of the EU average is not only a development gap. It is a benchmark for the scale of reform still required.
