The disorder at Montenegro’s airports is no longer a minor operational inconvenience. It has become a reputational liability for the entire tourism economy and a visible test of whether an EU-focused government can manage the country’s most important international gateways.
The ownership question is unambiguous. Aerodromi Crne Gore AD is wholly owned by the Government of Montenegro. Its statute identifies the government as the company’s sole founder and owner and explicitly reserves for it the principal management, control, consolidation and development responsibilities affecting the airport operator. The government also nominates the members of the board of directors. This means that responsibility cannot credibly be displaced onto an abstract “airport system” or attributed solely to individual employees working inside overcrowded terminals.
The ultimate owner is the state of Montenegro, acting through the government. The government selects the board. The board supervises the company and appoints or controls executive management. Executive management runs the airport system, while the directors of Podgorica and Tivat airports carry direct responsibility for local operations. The present governance chain includes Stefan Madžgalj, president of the board; board members Nikola Bajčetić, Edina Dacić, Velizar Kaluđerović and Darko Bulatović; Roko Tolić, executive director; Petar Radulović, deputy executive director; Dragan Milanović, director of Podgorica Airport; and Ivan Rakočević, director of Tivat Airport. These are not ceremonial positions. They carry different but identifiable layers of corporate and operational accountability. Aerodromi Crne Gore’s management register
The heaviest political responsibility rests with the Government of Montenegro and the ministry responsible for transport. The airports have been known for years to suffer from inadequate terminal space, insufficient aircraft stands, weak passenger-processing capacity and, particularly in Tivat, severe airside limitations. Yet successive governments allowed the concession procedure, launched in 2018, to consume almost a decade without producing either a concessionaire or a credible state-financed alternative delivered on time.
That delay cannot be treated as neutral administrative time. Montenegro continued marketing itself as a premium Mediterranean destination, airlines added routes, passenger volumes increased and private investors committed capital to hotels, resorts, marinas and residential projects. The state therefore encouraged demand while failing to expand the public infrastructure required to receive it.
The contradiction became especially sharp in 2026. Aerodromi Crne Gore expects approximately 3.63 million passengers, an increase of around 18 per cent from the record 3.08 million handled in 2025. Aircraft movements are expected to rise by 15 per cent to 14,384. Podgorica alone is projected to receive approximately 2.29 million passengers, up 31 per cent, supported by Wizz Air’s new base and 17 additional routes. This was not an unexpected summer surge. It was incorporated into the company’s own business planning months in advance.
Once management accepts new routes, negotiates airline incentives and publicly celebrates record passenger growth, it also accepts an obligation to demonstrate that terminals, stands, baggage systems, security lanes, border-control areas, ground-handling resources and contingency arrangements can process that growth. Attracting flights without establishing adequate handling capacity is not a complete commercial success. It is demand generation without delivery capability.
The position at Tivat is even more damaging because Tivat Airport is the principal aviation gateway for Boka Kotorska, Porto Montenegro, Luštica Bay, Portonovi, Budva and a large part of Montenegro’s premium coastal tourism market. Visitors paying several hundred euros per night do not separate the airport from the destination. Overcrowding, lengthy queues, diversions, cancellations, inadequate terminal conditions and poor communication become part of their assessment of Montenegro.
A tourist may admire the Bay of Kotor and still decide never to repeat the journey. That lost visitor will rarely file a formal complaint with the government. The economic damage appears later through weaker repeat bookings, negative online reviews, reduced recommendations and greater resistance to Montenegro’s already elevated hotel and transport prices. In tourism, the airport is both the first and last physical encounter with the country. A disastrous departure experience can overwrite much of the goodwill accumulated during the holiday.
Tivat Airport’s constraints are not new. The airport reportedly operates with only seven parking stands, lacks a parallel taxiway and does not have runway lighting sufficient to enable the airport to function as a normal night-time commercial airport. These limitations reduce resilience and leave little room to recover when weather, congestion, delayed inbound aircraft or operational incidents disrupt the schedule. Recent criticism concerning queues, diversions and delays therefore describes the consequences of a structural problem that has been visible for years, rather than an unforeseeable event. Recent reporting on Tivat’s operational disruption
The executive management of Aerodromi Crne Gore bears direct responsibility for the operational response. Even where management cannot build a new terminal within one season, it can prepare a summer-capacity plan. That includes temporary passenger-processing structures, redesigned passenger flows, additional check-in and security capacity, shaded queueing areas, functioning cooling and sanitation, stronger ground-handling shifts, coordinated slot management, disruption protocols and real-time multilingual passenger communication.
Bad infrastructure does not absolve management from managing. It raises the importance of preparation.
The board of directors bears a separate responsibility. Its role is to challenge management, approve plans, monitor execution and protect the long-term value of the state-owned company. The board should have required a documented 2026 peak-season readiness assessment, including passenger throughput by hour, stand utilisation, staffing ratios, baggage capacity, security and border-processing times, diversion risks and contingency arrangements. It should also be asking why traffic expansion was permitted to outpace usable infrastructure and why a company forecasting €47.3 million in operating revenue, approximately €18.3 million in EBITDA and €13.37 million in net profit still entered another summer with conditions capable of humiliating passengers and damaging the national tourism brand.
Profitability makes the failure harder, not easier, to defend. Aerodromi Crne Gore is not an insolvent public utility without cash-generating capacity. Its 2026 plan reportedly provides €21.3 million for equipment, works and services, although earlier planning documents referred to a narrower investment envelope of roughly €15 million. Labour costs are forecast at approximately €23.7 million, close to half of operating revenue. The relevant accountability question is therefore not simply whether the company is profitable, but whether its financial resources and organisational structure are being converted into measurable passenger capacity and service quality.
The government’s long-running indecision between concession and state operation has become the central governance failure. Infrastructure projects were repeatedly postponed while officials waited for the concession process to conclude. Yet a concession tender is not an investment. Until a contract is signed, financed and implemented, the state remains responsible for maintaining and developing the assets it owns.
The proposed concession reportedly envisaged around €300 million of investment, a €100 million upfront paymentand a payment to the state equivalent to 35 per cent of gross revenue. Whatever the merits of that proposal, the government had a duty to set a decision deadline and maintain a fully funded interim investment programme. Instead, the country appears to have experienced the worst combination: years of political debate, delayed capital expenditure, continuing public ownership and no completed strategic reconstruction.
The recent proposal to terminate or cancel the concession process does not erase the lost years. Tourism specialists have already warned that approximately seven years were lost while Montenegro failed to settle the ownership and investment model. Others argue that the profitable state operator can finance reconstruction from retained earnings and borrowing, potentially using EU funds once eligible projects are prepared. Both positions are legitimate. What is no longer legitimate is further delay without a binding investment schedule. RTCG reporting on the reconstruction debate
The airport controversy also exposes a broader weakness in Montenegro’s EU narrative. EU integration is not demonstrated only by closing negotiating chapters or adopting legislation. It is demonstrated through institutions that plan capacity, appoint competent boards, publish performance indicators, execute capital projects and accept responsibility when public services fail.
A government that presents Montenegro as the next EU member cannot treat airport management as a source of political appointments while distancing itself from the consequences. The airport board members are nominated by the government. The government is the sole shareholder. The company’s statute reserves critical control and development functions to that shareholder. Political responsibility therefore runs directly back to the cabinet.
There are nevertheless limits to the allocation of blame. Airlines remain responsible for their own scheduling, aircraft availability, passenger information and compensation where delays or cancellations fall within their control. Air-traffic management, weather and disruptions elsewhere in the European network can also produce delays that no Montenegrin airport can prevent. The police and border authorities control passport processing, while the Civil Aviation Agency carries regulatory and safety responsibilities.
But these distinctions do not excuse chronic overcrowding, insufficient processing capacity or the absence of adequate contingency planning. External disruption becomes damaging precisely when an airport has no spare capacity with which to absorb it.
The responsibility is consequently layered but clear. The government bears ultimate ownership and political responsibility. The board bears corporate-governance responsibility. Executive management bears responsibility for investment execution, resource allocation and system-wide operational readiness. The directors of Podgorica and Tivat bear responsibility for daily airport performance. Airlines and other public authorities are responsible only for the specific functions under their control.
Public relations cannot repair that chain of failure. Announcements about record passenger numbers, new destinations and rising revenues become counterproductive when passengers encounter conditions inconsistent with those claims. In that situation, promotional communication appears detached from reality and can deepen public frustration.
The proper response would begin with publication of independently verified operational data: peak-hour terminal capacity, average and maximum queue times, cancellations and diversions by cause, baggage-delivery times, passenger complaints, equipment availability, capital-expenditure implementation and specific board-approved deadlines for remedial work. Management performance should then be assessed against those indicators rather than against media visibility or the annual increase in passenger numbers.
Montenegro’s airports are not merely transport facilities. They are core infrastructure supporting a tourism sector that contributes roughly a quarter of economic activity directly and indirectly, sustains coastal employment, supports real-estate investment and provides a large share of the country’s foreign-currency income. Damage inflicted at the airport propagates across hotels, restaurants, tour operators, airlines, marinas, property developers and the national reputation.
The government owns the airports and appoints those who govern them. It therefore owns the consequences as well. Continuing to celebrate additional flights while passengers face infrastructure little changed from a decade ago sends a damaging message: Montenegro wants the revenue generated by tourism growth but has not shown the institutional discipline required to manage that growth.
