The deterioration of passenger conditions at Montenegro’s airports has moved beyond a domestic management dispute. As congestion, delays, diversions and inadequate terminal capacity become recurrent features of the summer season, the question is whether the European Union, European aviation institutions and international airlines can force the Montenegrin government and Aerodromi Crne Gore to implement urgent recovery measures.
The answer is qualified but important. The EU cannot directly order Montenegro to construct a new terminal simply because passengers are dissatisfied or because the airport experience is damaging the country’s tourism reputation. Montenegro remains outside the Union, and decisions concerning public investment, airport ownership and corporate management remain national responsibilities. Yet the country participates in the European Common Aviation Area, is aligning its aviation system with the EU acquis and is negotiating EU membership under a framework that gives Brussels considerable regulatory, financial and political influence.
That influence becomes significantly stronger when poor infrastructure moves from inconvenience into safety, security, passenger protection or regulatory non-compliance.
Montenegro’s airports are owned by the state through Aerodromi Crne Gore AD, whose sole shareholder is the Government of Montenegro. The government nominates the board, retains strategic control over the company and bears ultimate responsibility for the development of the airport system. The immediate enforcement authority, however, is the Civil Aviation Agency of Montenegro, which is responsible for regulatory oversight and airport certification.
The agency can inspect Podgorica and Tivat airports, identify non-conformities, require corrective-action plans and impose operational restrictions where airport conditions cannot safely accommodate scheduled traffic. This could include limits on peak-hour movements, restrictions on simultaneous aircraft handling, requirements for additional ground-handling resources or deadlines for resolving specific infrastructure and equipment deficiencies.
That distinction is critical. An airport’s commercial ambition is not the same as its safe and functional capacity. Aerodromi Crne Gore may want to accept more routes and maximise passenger growth, but the regulator has an obligation to assess whether terminals, stands, aprons, security lanes, baggage systems, firefighting services and emergency arrangements can sustain that traffic.
The issue is especially acute in Tivat, which remains the principal aviation gateway to the Bay of Kotor and Montenegro’s premium coastal tourism market. The airport reportedly operates with only seven aircraft parking stands, without a parallel taxiway and without the runway-lighting infrastructure required for normal night-time operations. These constraints leave little room to recover when weather, delayed inbound aircraft, stand congestion or operational incidents disturb the schedule.
Tivat’s practical capacity is therefore narrower than its annual passenger figures might suggest. A relatively small disruption can spread across the day, producing aircraft holding, diversions, missed rotations, congested departure areas and passengers waiting in facilities that were never designed for the present volume and concentration of traffic.
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency, or EASA, cannot normally direct Montenegro’s government to finance a terminal expansion. Its mandate is centred on aviation safety, standardisation and regulatory performance rather than tourism quality or passenger comfort. But EASA can inspect the implementation of European aviation standards, review the work of the national regulator and require corrective measures where safety-related deficiencies are identified.
Montenegro participates in European aviation-safety cooperation and is subject to technical monitoring and standardisation activity. A serious finding concerning airport operations, regulatory oversight or implementation of the aviation acquis could require the Montenegrin authorities to prepare a formal corrective-action programme. Repeated failure to close such findings would become an EU integration issue as well as an aviation problem.
Overcrowding alone may not automatically constitute a safety breach. Overcrowding that obstructs emergency exits, exceeds evacuation assumptions, compromises security screening or prevents controlled passenger movement could do so. Similarly, inadequate cooling or seating may initially appear to be a service-quality problem, but extreme temperatures, insufficient ventilation and excessive passenger density can create health, emergency-response and occupational-safety risks.
The same applies to airside operations. Shortages of stands, congested aprons, inadequate lighting, unreliable equipment or insufficient separation between aircraft, vehicles and personnel may trigger regulatory intervention where they affect certified operating conditions. The legal threshold is not whether the airport looks embarrassing, but whether the airport continues to operate within approved safety and security parameters.
The European Commission possesses a broader instrument: Montenegro’s EU accession process. Aviation falls within Chapter 14 on transport policy, which covers technical standards, safety, security, market access, competition and regulatory alignment. The Commission can include airport governance and aviation deficiencies in its annual assessment of Montenegro, require time-bound reforms and make progress in negotiations dependent on stronger implementation.
For a government presenting Montenegro as the EU’s next prospective member, a formal finding that its principal international gateways lack adequate oversight or operational resilience would be politically damaging. EU accession is intended to demonstrate that state institutions can enforce rules, manage public assets and implement infrastructure policy—not merely transpose legislation.
The Commission can also raise persistent aviation problems through the institutional structure of the European Common Aviation Area Agreement. That agreement extends important elements of the EU’s internal aviation market to Montenegro and other Western Balkan participants. It is based on shared rules concerning safety, security, competition, market access and operating conditions.
Where a participating country fails to meet binding obligations, the agreement provides mechanisms for consultation, corrective engagement and, in serious unresolved cases, safeguard measures. Such measures are not designed to punish countries for unattractive terminals. They are intended to address substantive regulatory or treaty failures. Montenegro’s airport conditions would therefore need to be documented through operational evidence rather than political criticism alone.
This makes independent technical assessment essential. Complaints, photographs and passenger testimony establish reputational damage, but enforcement requires measurable findings: passenger density, queue duration, security throughput, evacuation capacity, aircraft-stand occupancy, baggage-system performance, equipment availability, staffing levels, delays by cause, diversions and incidents affecting safety or security.
Airlines can provide much of this evidence. They cannot order Montenegro to build airport infrastructure, but they hold considerable commercial power because every airport ultimately depends on carriers assigning aircraft and routes to it.
Airlines can reduce frequencies, transfer services from Tivat to Podgorica, schedule flights outside congested periods, decline new routes or leave the market. They can demand lower charges and stronger operational guarantees. They can also submit formal safety and performance concerns to the Civil Aviation Agency, EASA, the European Commission and international aviation organisations.
A single complaint may produce limited pressure. A coordinated intervention by several carriers serving Montenegro could be much more consequential. Airlines such as Air Serbia, Wizz Air, Ryanair, Turkish Airlines, Austrian Airlines, easyJet, British Airways, Lufthansa Group carriers, LOT, flydubai and other seasonal operators have access to precise operational data. They can quantify holding time, diversions, missed slots, ground delays, crew disruption, passenger handling costs and schedule deterioration.
These costs are material. A delayed aircraft does not merely inconvenience the passengers travelling to or from Montenegro. It may miss subsequent rotations elsewhere in Europe, push crews beyond permitted working hours and force airlines to provide replacement aircraft, hotels, transfers or rebooking. Additional fuel, ground handling and network disruption can quickly turn a commercially attractive seasonal route into an operational liability.
Airlines will tolerate congestion where yields compensate for the cost. They will reconsider capacity when unreliability damages the profitability of the entire aircraft rotation. Montenegro competes for airline capacity with Croatia, Albania, Greece, Italy and other Mediterranean destinations, many of which are expanding airports and actively negotiating route development. Aircraft can be reassigned faster than Montenegro can build a new terminal.
Aerodromi Crne Gore’s use of airline incentives strengthens the carriers’ negotiating position. The company expects to grant approximately €18.06 million in airline incentives in 2026, around one-third of projected gross aviation revenue. These incentives are intended to attract additional routes and passenger volumes. Paying increasing commercial incentives while failing to deliver matching airport capacity creates a distorted model in which the state subsidises traffic growth but does not adequately finance the infrastructure needed to process it.
Airlines could make future expansion conditional on measurable improvements. Those conditions might include additional stands, more reliable ground handling, better security throughput, extended operating hours, strengthened baggage services, improved border-control capacity and functioning contingency procedures. Carriers considering new bases or routes could postpone commitments until those measures are delivered.
The government cannot reasonably present such airline decisions as hostile behaviour. Airlines are commercial operators with duties toward passengers, crews, shareholders and network reliability. Where an airport repeatedly creates avoidable disruption, reducing exposure is a rational business decision.
Passengers themselves possess a narrower enforcement route. Depending on the route, carrier and circumstances, European-derived passenger-rights rules may provide compensation, reimbursement, rebooking, meals or accommodation after cancellations and major delays. Airlines are not automatically liable where disruption arises from extraordinary circumstances outside their control, including certain airport, air-traffic, weather or security events.
That distinction can intensify pressure on the airport operator. Where airlines believe that recurring delays are caused by inadequate airport infrastructure or handling performance, they may seek contractual remedies, revise commercial terms or challenge the allocation of costs. Tour operators, cruise companies, hotel groups and destination-management businesses could similarly document losses connected to missed transfers, disrupted package arrangements and dissatisfied guests.
Montenegro’s premium tourism operators have a particularly strong interest in coordinated action. Porto Montenegro, Luštica Bay, Portonovi, major hotel groups, tour operators and coastal municipalities depend on reliable air access. Their investments are exposed to an infrastructure system controlled by the state but not developing at the same pace as accommodation, marina and real-estate capacity.
A visitor paying premium prices does not distinguish between the airport company, border police, airline and government. The visitor experiences a single destination. Serious disorder at arrival or departure becomes part of Montenegro’s tourism product and influences whether the traveller returns.
The economic exposure extends beyond a single season. Montenegro’s tourism industry depends heavily on repeat visitors, recommendations and international reputation. The immediate revenue from an additional passenger can therefore be outweighed by the lifetime value lost when that passenger decides not to return and discourages others from travelling.
The EU’s most constructive contribution would combine regulatory pressure with project financing. Montenegro could seek support through pre-accession funding, the Western Balkans Investment Framework, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Financing could cover terminal expansion, airside works, energy efficiency, security equipment, digital passenger processing, baggage systems, surface access and climate resilience.
Such financing would require a mature project pipeline. The government and Aerodromi Crne Gore would need feasibility studies, demand forecasts, concept and detailed designs, environmental assessments, cost-benefit analysis, procurement plans and clearly allocated implementation responsibilities. A politically announced intention to reconstruct the airports would not be enough.
Urgent measures do not need to wait for EU financing or membership. Aerodromi Crne Gore expects approximately €47.3 million in operating revenue, €18.3 million in EBITDA and €13.37 million in net profit during 2026. Its planned expenditure on equipment, works and services reportedly reaches €21.3 million. The company therefore has a financial base from which to fund temporary capacity, equipment and immediate operational improvements while arranging longer-term debt and institutional financing.
A credible intervention should begin with an extraordinary independent review of both airports. The review should cover terminal capacity by hour, passenger density, security and border-processing time, baggage throughput, stand utilisation, ground-handling resources, emergency systems, cooling, sanitation, staffing, passenger communication and disruption recovery.
The findings should be submitted simultaneously to the Government of Montenegro, the Civil Aviation Agency, Aerodromi Crne Gore’s board, EASA and the European Commission. That would prevent the issue from being reduced to competing political statements and place responsibility within a documented compliance framework.
Aerodromi Crne Gore should then be required to produce a recovery programme divided into immediate, pre-season and structural measures. Temporary processing facilities, additional security equipment, improved passenger flows, stronger staffing, cooling, sanitation, shaded waiting areas and real-time multilingual communication can be delivered quickly. New terminals, additional aircraft stands, taxiway development, runway-lighting upgrades and major access improvements require a multi-year capital programme.
The board should publish progress against physical milestones rather than promotional statements about record passenger numbers. Executive management should be assessed against queue times, equipment availability, operational resilience, passenger satisfaction and investment delivery. The government, as sole shareholder, should replace management or board members where agreed targets are repeatedly missed.
The EU can reinforce those obligations through the accession process, ECAA mechanisms, EASA oversight and conditional financing. Airlines can force the issue commercially by refusing further expansion, modifying schedules or reallocating aircraft. Tourism investors can document the damage and demand that air-access infrastructure be treated as an economic priority.
None of these actors can substitute for the airport owner. The Government of Montenegro owns Aerodromi Crne Gore, appoints its governing structure and controls the strategic investment model. European institutions and airlines can make continued inaction more expensive, but the authority and responsibility to repair the airports remain in Podgorica.
