Montenegro is moving into what European officials increasingly describe as the “endgame” of its European Union accession process, with Brussels now formally beginning preparations for the country’s accession treaty and positioning Podgorica as the Western Balkans’ most advanced membership candidate. The shift marks the most serious enlargement momentum Montenegro has experienced since opening negotiations with the EU in 2012.
The political significance is substantial.
For the first time in years, the European Union is not merely discussing Montenegro as a long-term candidate, but actively preparing institutional mechanisms associated with actual membership entry. In April, EU ambassadors approved the establishment of an ad hoc working group tasked with drafting Montenegro’s accession treaty — a procedural step widely interpreted in Brussels as confirmation that the bloc now considers Montenegrin membership a realistic medium-term outcome.
Prime Minister Milojko Spajić’s government has publicly set an ambitious objective of closing all negotiating chapters by the end of 2026 and achieving full EU membership by 2028.
At present, Montenegro has provisionally closed 14 out of 33 negotiating chapters, making it the most advanced EU candidate among the Western Balkan states. The country already fulfilled the critical interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24 — judiciary, rule of law and security — which Brussels treats as the gateway for completing the final phase of accession negotiations.
The tone inside European institutions has changed noticeably.
European Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos recently stated that Montenegro is now “in the endgame,” while warning that some of the most difficult reforms still remain ahead. The European Commission simultaneously described Montenegro and the EU as “closer than ever” after more than fourteen years of negotiations.
Behind the political symbolism lies a much larger geopolitical calculation.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fundamentally altered the EU’s enlargement strategy. Brussels increasingly views Western Balkan integration less as a bureaucratic neighborhood policy and more as a strategic security imperative aimed at reducing geopolitical instability and limiting Russian and Chinese influence in Southeast Europe.
Montenegro fits that strategy particularly well.
Unlike Serbia, Podgorica aligned fully with EU sanctions against Russia, joined NATO and consistently maintained a pro-Western foreign-policy orientation. Brussels therefore increasingly treats Montenegro as a politically manageable accession candidate capable of demonstrating that EU enlargement policy still functions.
Spajić himself recently framed EU membership less as a financial issue and more as a strategic security and market-access project. According to statements highlighted by Politico and regional media, Montenegro now views EU accession primarily through the lens of stability, access to the single market and geopolitical positioning rather than infrastructure subsidies alone.
Economically, the implications could be transformative.
EU membership would integrate Montenegro into the world’s largest single market while potentially lowering sovereign borrowing costs, improving investor confidence and accelerating capital inflows into tourism, infrastructure, renewable energy and logistics sectors.
That prospect is already influencing investment dynamics across Montenegro’s economy.
Luxury tourism projects, coastal real estate, marina developments, renewable energy investments and infrastructure financing increasingly price in the assumption that Montenegro may eventually transition from a peripheral Adriatic market into a fully integrated EU jurisdiction.
The banking sector, sovereign debt market and foreign direct investment flows are especially sensitive to that perception.
EU accession would likely strengthen institutional credibility, improve regulatory predictability and deepen access to European financing mechanisms. For a small economy heavily dependent on tourism and foreign capital inflows, those effects could materially alter long-term growth dynamics.
Yet the final phase may also prove the most difficult.
While technical progress accelerated sharply during the past two years, the remaining chapters involve some of the politically most sensitive reforms: judicial independence, anti-corruption enforcement, institutional appointments, public administration reform and media freedom.
European institutions continue warning that implementation — not merely legislative adoption — will determine whether Montenegro reaches the finish line.
This is particularly important because the EU itself changed its enlargement philosophy after earlier experiences with democratic backsliding in some member states. Commissioner Kos explicitly stated that future accession treaties may include “stronger safeguards” against deterioration of rule-of-law standards after membership.
That means Montenegro faces a more demanding accession environment than earlier enlargement waves.
Domestic political fragmentation also remains a risk.
Montenegro’s coalition landscape remains highly unstable, balancing pro-European factions, nationalist forces, identity politics and institutional tensions inherited from the country’s post-Yugoslav political evolution. Fitch Solutions recently warned that the 2028 target remains “overly ambitious” because of continuing weaknesses in judicial reform and anti-corruption implementation.
The broader European environment also matters.
Although enlargement regained momentum after 2022, EU member states remain cautious about absorbing new members amid rising internal political fragmentation, migration pressure, fiscal constraints and geopolitical uncertainty. Enlargement support exists, but it is increasingly conditional and security-driven rather than idealistic.
Still, Montenegro’s trajectory increasingly appears more advanced than any Western Balkan candidate before it since Croatia joined the EU in 2013.
Brussels is effectively testing whether the enlargement process can still produce a credible success story.
For Montenegro, the next eighteen months may therefore determine not only its own European future, but also the credibility of the EU’s entire Western Balkans strategy.
