Herceg Novi’s unexpectedly strong 2026 nautical season is beginning to expose something more important than another good year for tourism. The city appears to have reached the point where demand for maritime access is exceeding the infrastructure available to capture it, turning the limitations of the municipal port at Škver into a potentially investable infrastructure story.
The numbers are increasingly difficult to dismiss as a temporary seasonal effect. Nautical tourism at Škver was around 12–15% stronger year on year in June, before accelerating to approximately 30–40% growth in July. During the period from around 20 July to the beginning of August, more than 30 vessels reportedly had to be refused berths because there was simply nowhere to accommodate them.
That follows already strong utilisation earlier in the summer. From the beginning of May to mid-July, berths were running at approximately 80% occupancy, with utilisation sometimes reaching 80–90% during both day and night periods. The city harbour manages approximately 26 conventional berths, roughly 30 mooring positions depending on vessel size, and can accommodate at most around 40 vessels when the available operational areas are fully used.
For infrastructure investors, that matters because Škver is displaying one of the most valuable characteristics an existing port can have before expansion: demonstrated demand.
There is already an observable customer base, existing port activity, strong pedestrian connectivity to the city and a shortage of capacity during the highest-value months. Expansion would therefore be aimed less at creating a new destination than at monetising traffic that Herceg Novi is already failing to accommodate.
Montenegro’s wider nautical market reinforces the argument. Official statistics show that 4,836 foreign leisure, sport and recreation vessels entered Montenegrin waters in 2025, carrying 25,800 people. Sailing yachts accounted for 42.7% of arrivals and motor yachts another 40.9%. Importantly for marina investment economics, 847 vessels, or 17.5% of all foreign vessels recorded, were longer than 20 metres. Another 793 vessels were between 15 and 20 metres.
Herceg Novi does not need to capture every part of that market through Škver. In fact, attempting to turn the city harbour into a direct competitor to Portonovi would probably be the wrong allocation of capital.
Portonovi Marina, at Kumbor, already provides 238 berths and can receive yachts and superyachts of up to 140 metres, together with deep-draft capability, fuel, water and high-capacity electricity, waste-water and oil-waste disposal, security and border-crossing services. It is designed around the premium and superyacht segment.
Škver’s competitive advantage is different. It sits immediately below the historic urban centre and promenade. Its economic value comes from transient sailing yachts, medium-sized motor yachts, charter fleets, excursion vessels, water taxis and local boats whose passengers can move directly into Herceg Novi’s restaurants, shops and accommodation.
That difference is important because an enlarged Škver could generate economic activity far beyond marina fees. Port management has previously indicated that roughly 1,000–1,500 visitors per day can arrive through the city port during periods of intensive passenger and excursion activity.
More capacity would therefore function partly as tourism infrastructure rather than merely as yacht parking.
The investment problem begins with the breakwater. Škver is particularly exposed to southerly and south-westerly winds, with waves capable of overtopping the breakwater during strong conditions. The existing constructed waterfront along the inner side of the breakwater is around 210 metres long, while water depths alongside it are generally above two metres.
The protection structure is also old. The breakwater in substantially its present configuration dates from 1955 and has suffered deterioration from storms, marine action and decades of exposure. Planning work has considered not only rehabilitation but a possible 20–30 metre extension intended to improve protection of the harbour basin.
That combination makes Škver particularly suitable for phased investment rather than a single conventional marina concession.
A screening-level investment scenario would place the first phase — breakwater rehabilitation, wave protection, structural strengthening, underwater works and a possible 20–30 metre extension — at approximately €8mn–€14mn. This is an analytical CAPEX range rather than an announced project budget and would need to be validated through bathymetric, structural, geotechnical and wave-model studies.
A second phase could require another €4mn–€7mn for reorganised moorings, floating pontoons where technically appropriate, electricity and water pedestals, upgraded fire protection, wastewater pump-out equipment, CCTV, digital berth management, navigation equipment and improved harbour-service facilities.
A third, more commercially oriented phase could add approximately €3mn–€5mn for passenger-handling areas, water-taxi infrastructure, public-space improvements, marina offices and limited commercial facilities integrated with the existing waterfront.
That produces an indicative development envelope of approximately €15mn–€25mn, potentially rising toward €30mn if underwater conditions require substantial reconstruction, dredging or additional coastal protection.
The crucial issue is who should finance which assets.
Asking a private marina operator to fund the entire breakwater reconstruction, coastal protection and commercial marina infrastructure under a relatively short concession would weaken the project economics. The protection structure provides a broad public benefit: it protects municipal vessels, commercial boats, sporting organisations, the waterfront and the wider harbour basin.
It therefore has a stronger case for public financing through Morsko dobro, Herceg Novi municipality, the state budget and potentially European infrastructure or environmental funding instruments.
The revenue-producing infrastructure can then be separated.
A private or mixed public-private operator could finance pontoons, utilities, digital systems, guest facilities, commercial berths and service infrastructure. An operator CAPEX requirement of roughly €6mn–€10mn would be much easier to finance than requiring the concessionaire to absorb the entire €15mn–€25mn civil-engineering programme.
The legal structure has become particularly important. Škver has operated for years without a stable long-term framework. Port management has repeatedly called for its status to be resolved and for a long-term concession that would provide a basis for investment in the breakwater and harbour.
Montenegro’s new Ports Law entered into force in January 2026. The framework provides mechanisms for concessions covering the construction, reconstruction, maintenance and financing of port infrastructure, including structures similar to build-operate-transfer arrangements.
That significantly improves the conceptual route toward a bankable Škver structure, but resolving the exact harbour boundaries and management rights remains essential.
A concession of around 15 years, previously discussed by city-port management, would provide far more certainty than the current situation. From a financing perspective, however, fifteen years is relatively short for an operator expected to amortise heavy marine civil works.
The most financially rational structure would therefore leave the core breakwater and coastal-protection CAPEX on the public side while allocating commercial infrastructure and operations to a concessionaire.
Under such a structure, an upgraded Škver does not require superyacht pricing to become viable.
A marina configuration with approximately 60–80 properly managed positions across the wider harbour basin, rather than the present practical maximum of around 40 vessels, could reserve a substantial proportion for municipal users while introducing a commercially priced transient component.
Medium-sized yachts visiting for several days, charter vessels, excursion operators and seasonal berth holders would provide the core revenue.
The commercial side would then be complemented by passenger charges, electricity and water sales, fuel-related concessions, wastewater services, water-taxi operations, charter turnaround services and lease income from carefully controlled waterfront activities.
A mature incremental revenue envelope of roughly €1mn–€2mn annually is conceivable under such a configuration, depending heavily on the eventual berth mix and the proportion reserved for local rather than commercial users. This is not a forecast of existing Škver revenue; it is an investment scenario designed to illustrate the level of monetisation that additional infrastructure would need to achieve.
At the upper end of that range, private marina CAPEX of €6mn–€10mn could support commercially acceptable returns. At the lower end, the project would behave more like municipal infrastructure and would require greater public funding.
The distinction matters because local access remains politically and socially important. Port management has previously argued that a large majority of future capacity should remain available to Herceg Novi residents rather than being converted entirely into premium commercial berths.
A viable model therefore needs a transparent separation between municipal and market-priced berths. Commercial users can partly cross-subsidise local access, but only if the concession contract allows the operator sufficient revenue from transient yachts, excursion traffic and ancillary services.
There is also a substantial urban-development argument.
Unlike a standalone marina outside a city centre, additional vessels at Škver produce immediate pedestrian traffic. A yacht crew arriving at Portonovi can remain inside a resort environment. A yacht crew arriving at Škver effectively lands inside Herceg Novi. Restaurants, cafés, supermarkets, accommodation providers, maintenance companies and taxi operators all participate in the spending chain.
That makes the economic return to the municipality broader than the direct financial return to the port operator.
The opportunity becomes stronger during the shoulder season. September is traditionally one of the more attractive periods for charter traffic because prices fall substantially from peak-season levels, extending nautical demand beyond the main July-August tourism concentration.
An expanded harbour capable of marketing winter berths, sailing events, yacht-club activity and charter shoulder-season packages could help move part of Herceg Novi’s tourism economy toward a longer operating season.
Port infrastructure also has to be built for resilience rather than simply capacity. Škver’s exposure to southern weather makes overtopping, utilities protection, storm resilience and future safe operating conditions central to the investment case.
The breakwater design therefore needs to address climate resilience and increasingly severe marine conditions rather than merely adding quay length.
The strongest investment case consequently has three layers: a publicly financed protection asset, a commercially financed marina operation and an urban waterfront that allows nautical spending to flow into the city.
This also explains why the current capacity shortage matters more than the headline growth rate itself. A 30–40% increase in July traffic is positive, but the economically important figure is the 30-plus vessels that had to be rejected. Those boats represent revenue that was already available to Herceg Novi but could not be captured because infrastructure was missing.
For years, discussion around Škver has centred on its unresolved legal status and deteriorating breakwater. The 2026 season is changing the economics of that discussion. Strong demand, high occupancy and actual rejected traffic are beginning to provide the evidence needed to move the port from a municipal maintenance issue toward a defined infrastructure investment.
A €15mn–€25mn programme, appropriately divided between public coastal-protection expenditure and private commercial marina capital, would remain modest compared with Montenegro’s large integrated luxury-marina developments. Its economic relevance to Herceg Novi could nevertheless be disproportionately large because Škver sits at the point where the maritime economy connects directly with the existing city.
Herceg Novi needs a three-port investment strategy linking Škver, Zelenika and Portonovi
Herceg Novi’s next phase of maritime development does not require another isolated marina. It requires a port system.
The municipality already possesses three maritime assets with very different characteristics: Portonovi, a modern private superyacht marina; Škver, an undersized city harbour embedded directly in the urban economy; and Zelenika, a deeper-water commercial port with international border facilities.
Treating them as parts of a single nautical and maritime investment corridor could create significantly more value than trying to make any one of them serve every segment of the market.
The unusually strong 2026 season at Škver shows why the question is becoming urgent. Nautical activity in July was reported 30–40% above the previous year, and more than 30 boats had to be refused during the period from late July into early August because available capacity had been exhausted.
Earlier in the summer, occupancy had already reached approximately 80–90% at peak periods, while the port could accommodate only around 40 vessels at maximum practical utilisation.
The immediate conclusion might be that Herceg Novi simply needs a larger marina. The geography and existing asset base point to a more sophisticated answer.
Portonovi already occupies the upper end of the market. Its marina provides 238 berths, accepts yachts of up to 140 metres and offers deep-draft access, electricity, water, fuel, waste handling, security and border services.
Trying to reproduce that product at Škver would duplicate existing infrastructure while using one of Herceg Novi’s most valuable central waterfront locations inefficiently.
Škver has a different role. It is a city marina. Its strongest customers are likely to remain transient sailing yachts, medium-sized motor yachts, charter boats, excursion vessels, local craft and potentially water-taxi services. Its strategic value comes from putting maritime visitors immediately onto the Herceg Novi promenade and below the historic centre.
Zelenika is different again.
Zelenika functions as a commercial port connected with international maritime traffic and has infrastructure suitable for vessels requiring deeper water. Its north-west quay is approximately 134 metres long, while the south-west quay is approximately 130 metres long, with depths materially greater than those available at Škver.
Those characteristics give Zelenika investment options unavailable at the city harbour.
The port could evolve toward yacht technical services, charter turnaround, customs and immigration handling, crew logistics, larger transient yachts, marine servicing and selected passenger operations.
With appropriate investment, it could also provide part of the infrastructure required for small expedition vessels or other higher-value passenger traffic that does not require the scale of a conventional cruise terminal.
Its weakness is protection. Zelenika is exposed to strong southerly and south-westerly winds, creating wave action inside the port. Any serious redevelopment therefore needs wave modelling and potentially additional protection works before investors assume year-round marina-quality operating conditions.
This leads to a natural three-tier strategy.
Portonovi remains the international premium and superyacht destination. Škver becomes the urban marina and city passenger gateway. Zelenika develops as the deeper-water service, entry and maritime-support node.
The concept would allow Herceg Novi to address several customer groups without forcing them into the same infrastructure.
A 50-metre superyacht does not need to compete for space with local fishing boats at Škver. A charter sailing yacht whose passengers want to spend an evening in the Old Town does not need the full infrastructure package of Portonovi. A yacht requiring customs procedures, technical work, crew logistics or deeper water does not necessarily need to occupy premium resort-marina space.
Connecting the assets rather than duplicating them is where the larger investment opportunity emerges.
At Škver, an indicative capital programme of approximately €15mn–€25mn could cover breakwater rehabilitation and a possible 20–30 metre extension, reorganised berthing, upgraded utilities, environmental services, passenger infrastructure and public-realm improvements.
At Zelenika, a screening-level investment of roughly €15mn–€25mn could support quay rehabilitation where required, upgraded electrical and water systems, shore-power capacity, wastewater reception, security, customs and passenger facilities, yacht-service infrastructure and targeted wave-protection works.
Another €5mn–€10mn across the municipality could support the infrastructure that turns separate ports into a network: water-taxi landing points, digital booking and harbour-management systems, common yacht-service platforms, electric maritime mobility, road-access improvements and passenger interchange facilities.
The resulting portfolio would represent an indicative investment envelope of approximately €35mn–€60mn.
This is not an announced Herceg Novi investment programme. It is a strategic capital scenario based on the existing infrastructure, observed demand and functions that could reasonably be distributed between the three locations.
The advantage of this approach is that a large part of the expenditure would be brownfield rather than greenfield.
Škver already has an operating port, a 210-metre constructed waterfront, electricity and water connections and an established customer base. Zelenika already has substantial deep-water quay infrastructure, utilities, road access and border functions. Portonovi already provides the internationally branded luxury component.
That dramatically changes development risk compared with creating an entirely new marina complex elsewhere on the coastline.
It also changes the financial structure required.
Breakwaters, harbour protection, dredging, navigation infrastructure and public passenger facilities have characteristics of public infrastructure and can reasonably be supported by state, municipal or Morsko dobro capital.
Commercial berths, marina management systems, repair services, yacht facilities, retail concessions and other revenue-producing infrastructure are better candidates for private investment.
Montenegro’s new Ports Law, effective from January 2026, provides a framework for concessions involving the financing, reconstruction and operation of port infrastructure.
The mechanism therefore exists. The challenge is converting uncertain operating rights into concession contracts long enough and clear enough to support project finance.
Škver is the clearest example. The city-port operator has repeatedly identified the unresolved legal status of the harbour as the main barrier to investment. The 2026 season has strengthened the argument for a long-term concession so that decisions can finally be made on the breakwater, harbour safety and future capacity.
The commercial logic suggests that public and private capital should not carry the same risks.
A private marina operator financing perhaps €6mn–€10mn of pontoons, utilities and customer infrastructure can potentially recover the investment through berth fees and services. A private operator financing a €20mn breakwater under the same short concession faces a much more difficult return profile.
Separating the assets would therefore improve bankability.
This model is also consistent with the direction of capital elsewhere in Boka Bay. Major marina-linked developments in Montenegro have demonstrated that institutional and international capital can support maritime infrastructure when projects combine clear ownership or concession rights, diversified revenue and professional operating standards.
The lesson for Herceg Novi is not that Škver or Zelenika should attempt another Porto Montenegro-scale development.
It is that maritime-linked coastal assets become substantially more financeable once ownership, concession duration, revenue allocation and infrastructure responsibilities are clearly structured.
Herceg Novi already has the market.
Montenegro recorded 4,836 foreign recreational vessels and 25,800 people aboard them in 2025. Almost 34% of vessels were longer than 15 metres, including 847 vessels above 20 metres.
At the local level, the city port has already demonstrated that demand can exceed supply. The question is therefore how much of the spending associated with those vessels Herceg Novi captures.
A three-port system would broaden that spending base.
Portonovi brings superyacht owners, high-end guests and premium services. Škver brings yacht crews and excursion passengers directly into the established city centre. Zelenika could create engineering, maintenance, transport, customs, logistics and maritime-service employment that is far less dependent on July and August tourism.
The service segment may ultimately be one of the most valuable parts of the strategy.
Berth fees are seasonal. Repairs, maintenance, winter preparation, crew changes, provisioning, technical inspections, customs services and yacht management can operate across much more of the year.
Herceg Novi could therefore use Zelenika to capture expenditure from vessels that currently berth elsewhere in Montenegro or Croatia for technical reasons even when their owners spend time around Boka Bay.
The geographical position reinforces the opportunity. Portonovi sits close to the entrance to Boka Bay, while Herceg Novi benefits from access to both Tivat and Dubrovnik airports.
The municipality can therefore compete as a maritime gateway without relying entirely on a single airport or transport corridor.
The surrounding investment environment is also improving gradually. Road, water and tourism infrastructure investment on the Herceg Novi side of the Luštica peninsula is opening additional areas for higher-value coastal development.
That creates an opportunity to coordinate capital instead of allowing individual projects to emerge independently.
A water-taxi network, for example, becomes more valuable if Portonovi, Škver and Zelenika are treated as connected nodes. Guests arriving at Portonovi could access the Old Town by sea. Charter boats could use Zelenika for entry and technical services before moving to Škver. Larger yachts could remain in Portonovi while tenders or water taxis bring passengers directly into central Herceg Novi.
This kind of connectivity produces additional value without requiring expensive new coastal construction.
Environmental infrastructure should be developed on the same network principle. Shore power, sewage pump-out, oil-waste collection and digital monitoring can progressively become common operating standards.
Portonovi already establishes a local benchmark for the quality international yacht clients expect. Škver and Zelenika do not need to replicate its luxury component, but they increasingly need to replicate the environmental and safety standard.
Climate resilience deserves similar treatment. Škver is exposed to southern waves and breakwater overtopping, while Zelenika is also vulnerable to strong southerly conditions.
New CAPEX should therefore be evaluated against future storm conditions rather than historical average operating conditions.
The strategic risk is not insufficient demand. It is institutional fragmentation.
Herceg Novi has a premium marina, a constrained city harbour and a deeper-water commercial port, but their economic functions have not yet been organised around a single maritime-development strategy.
The unresolved status at Škver illustrates the cost of that fragmentation: vessels are already being rejected while the city continues discussing who can legally invest in the infrastructure required to receive them.
The 2026 nautical season has made the opportunity easier to quantify.
A €35mn–€60mn staged maritime investment programme across Škver, Zelenika and connecting infrastructure would be small beside Montenegro’s largest coastal resort developments. Properly structured, however, it could create something those individual developments cannot: a complete Herceg Novi maritime economy spanning municipal boating, charter tourism, international yachts, premium superyachts, passenger traffic and marine services.
Portonovi has already demonstrated that Herceg Novi can attract international marina capital. The next investment phase is less about proving the destination and more about building the public and commercial infrastructure around the demand that is already there.
