A renewed demand for a dedicated fishing port in Herceg Novi has turned a local argument over berths at the Lazure marina in Meljine into a broader test of how Montenegro manages coastal concessions, public infrastructure and its obligations as a prospective member of the European Union.
Novska Lista, a local political group, said commercial fishing in the Bay of Kotor could not develop without secure berths, regulated landing points and basic shore-side infrastructure. Its representatives raised the issue after meeting Savo Ćetković, president of the National Association of Fish Producers of Montenegro, whose members have spent years seeking permanent moorings and a safe place to land their catch.
The demand is not simply for somewhere to tie up small boats. A functioning fishing port is the physical link between vessels, food-safety controls, catch registration, cold storage, wholesalers and restaurants. Without that link, investment in newer vessels or higher catches does little to create a commercially viable industry.
Montenegro has a coastline of roughly 300 kilometres, a large tourism market and demand from hotels and restaurants for fresh seafood. Yet the country still lacks a fully dedicated fishing port. Commercial vessels rely on city harbours, mixed-use marinas and a limited number of berths dispersed along the coast.
The weakness is visible in the structure of the fleet. The most recent comprehensive sector data identified 338 registered fishing vessels, including 24 trawlers, 27 purse seiners and 56 longliners. The rest consist largely of small vessels using gill nets and other coastal gear.
The average vessel is about 32 years old and only slightly longer than seven metres. Few boats have refrigeration or cold-storage capacity, while vessel-monitoring systems have historically covered about 10 per cent of the fleet and automatic identification systems about 8 per cent. Montenegro has since invested in new equipment and digital control, but the underlying fleet remains small, fragmented and capital constrained.
This is the commercial context behind Novska Lista’s claim that there can be no serious fishing industry without a port. A vessel owner is unlikely to borrow for a new boat, refrigeration unit or more efficient engine without secure access to a berth, fuel, maintenance services and an authorised landing point. Banks cannot comfortably finance an asset whose operating base is informal or dependent on temporary permission from a marina dominated by recreational vessels.
The absence of landing infrastructure also affects the price fishermen receive. Montenegro has no organised fish auction, and catches are generally sold directly to restaurants, retailers, market traders or intermediaries. This can work for small quantities of high-value white fish, but it is unsuitable for larger catches of sardine, anchovy and other blue fish that require rapid unloading, chilling and distribution.
Purse seiners can land significant volumes in a short period, but the fish lose value quickly without ice, temperature-controlled handling and an organised buyer. The absence of processing capacity further limits the economics of this fleet segment. Montenegro has only a small number of processors, and their combined industrial capacity is insufficient to absorb large or irregular catches.
Fuel represents between 19 and 39 per cent of operating costs in parts of the marine fleet, with the burden highest for trawlers. Ageing engines, frequent maintenance and limited onboard refrigeration add to the disadvantage. Smaller coastal vessels can sometimes earn better margins by targeting premium species and selling directly to restaurants, but that model cannot supply the volumes required by the wider tourism and retail market.
The result is an economy that imports seafood despite having its own coastline and established fishing communities. Fish and seafood trade reached approximately €26mn in 2022, with exports accounting for only around 0.2 per cent of the total. Imports had increased by about €6.5mn, or 34 per cent, from the previous year.
Domestic consumption was estimated at only 6.75 kilograms per person, far below the level in many Mediterranean economies. Even at that comparatively modest consumption rate, domestic production could not meet demand. The gap becomes more pronounced during the tourism season, when Montenegro’s effective population expands and hotels and restaurants compete for seabass, seabream, octopus, squid, shellfish and other products.
A fishing port in Herceg Novi would therefore serve three markets at once. It would support local commercial fishermen, provide a controlled landing point for the wider Bay of Kotor and strengthen supply to the tourism economy. It could also become a collection centre for mariculture operators, although aquaculture and wild capture would require separate handling, reporting and sanitary procedures.
The bay already supports commercial cultivation of mussels, oysters, seabass and seabream. About two dozen businesses have held permits for fish or shellfish farming in the area. Earlier production data showed annual marine aquaculture output of approximately 366 tonnes, of which mussels accounted for 61 per cent, seabass 20 per cent, seabream 17 per cent and oysters roughly 3 per cent.
That is still a small industry, but it has a clearer path to scale than unrestricted expansion of wild capture. Fish stocks in the Adriatic are shared and environmentally sensitive. Fleet growth must therefore be matched to scientifically assessed fishing opportunities, while aquaculture can expand through new sites, better feed systems, hatchery support and improved environmental controls.
The infrastructure required at Meljine would consequently need to go beyond moorings. A credible fisheries hub would include a designated landing quay, protected access for commercial vessels, weighing and recording equipment, an ice plant, chilled storage, freshwater and electricity connections, fuel supply, waste collection, facilities for used oil and fishing gear, sanitary inspection space and controlled access for refrigerated vehicles.
A larger version could add a first-sale market, packaging equipment, a small processing unit and maintenance facilities. Digital systems would need to connect landing declarations, vessel records, catch documentation and traceability data. Those functions determine whether fish can move from a boat into a hotel kitchen, supermarket or export supply chain without gaps in its legal and sanitary record.
Montenegro’s planned fishing port at Cape Đerane in Ulcinj, previously estimated at approximately €15mn, provides a reference for the scale of investment required for a full-purpose facility. A smaller installation at Lazure, particularly one using an existing breakwater and harbour basin, should require less capital, but no credible engineering design or current cost estimate has been made public.
The actual cost would depend on whether the state requires only berths and a landing point or intends to create a complete cold-chain and first-sale centre. Spending several million euros on moorings without logistics would solve only the most visible part of the problem. It would allow vessels to remain in the harbour but would not create the infrastructure needed for traceability, food safety or higher-value sales.
The dispute at Lazure is complicated because local fishermen argue that much of this infrastructure was already part of an existing development obligation.
In November 2016, Imperio Holding Limited signed an agreement with the state-owned coastal-zone manager Morsko Dobro covering development of the Lazure complex. The documentation envisaged both a nautical-tourism port and a fishing port, with the completed port infrastructure becoming state property.
The resort and commercial marina were subsequently built, and the five-star Lazure Hotel & Marina opened in 2018. The marina contains roughly 220 berths, protected by a reconstructed breakwater. It is now an established asset within Herceg Novi’s higher-end tourism offer.
Fishermen maintain that the commercial part of the development entered operation while the fishing component, associated logistics and promised access were never delivered in the contracted form. They have sought intervention from the government, Morsko Dobro and other state institutions, arguing that a private investor should not be permitted to commercialise the profitable marina while leaving public obligations unresolved.
Lazure’s management has rejected allegations that it disregards the law or local fishermen. It has said that the investor operates in accordance with Montenegrin legislation, co-operates with state and municipal institutions, and has provided satisfactory conditions to local users. The company has also pointed to an Administrative Court ruling requiring the authorities to decide on its application for the port to be formally classified as a nautical-tourism marina.
The legal and contractual questions are not identical. A facility may meet technical conditions to be classified as a marina while a separate dispute remains over whether the investor fulfilled all obligations contained in the development agreement. The court’s requirement that the administration issue a decision does not by itself establish that every fishing-port or communal-berth obligation was completed.
The documents cited by the opposing sides also reveal differences over the number and purpose of berths. Earlier official explanations referred to at least 156 berths, of which 50 could be used commercially by the investor and the remainder reserved for residents. Fishermen’s organisations have referred to 116 communal berths for commercial fishermen and the local population, together with shore-side logistics. Other records have cited a fishing section of 106 berths.
Those inconsistencies are sufficient reason for a formal technical and contractual audit. The government should be able to establish the approved design, the concession boundaries, the number of constructed berths, their current users, the tariff arrangements, the areas assigned to public use and the precise infrastructure that was required for commercial fishing.
This need not become an ideological choice between tourism investment and traditional fishing. The original logic of the Lazure arrangement appears to have been that a profitable hotel and marina development would coexist with public maritime functions. Mixed-use coastal concessions often rely on precisely this bargain: an investor receives the opportunity to commercialise valuable state-controlled land or shoreline while financing infrastructure that would otherwise fall to the public budget.
Such agreements only remain credible when the obligations on both sides are measurable and enforced. Allowing commercially valuable elements to proceed while public components remain disputed increases regulatory risk for every investor operating on the Montenegrin coast. It suggests that concession outcomes may depend on institutional fragmentation rather than the written contract.
For lenders and strategic investors, that is not a minor governance issue. Montenegro is seeking capital for ports, hotels, marinas, energy projects and transport infrastructure. Investors need confidence that contractual rights will be protected, but they also need to know that obligations will be enforced consistently. Selective enforcement may appear favourable to one project in the short term while increasing the country risk premium applied to future transactions.
The fisheries sector itself is economically small. The government’s development strategy places annual sector output at approximately €7.4mn, while wider estimates put its contribution at less than 0.5 per cent of GDP and no more than about €12mn a year. That scale means a fishing port will not transform Montenegro’s public finances or materially affect sovereign debt.
Its institutional importance is greater than its immediate contribution to GDP. The state adopted a 2024–2029 Fisheries Development Strategy with planned expenditure of €26.52mn. Approximately €15.65mn was expected through World Bank-supported MIDAS programmes, €4.47mn from the national budget and €3.61mn from EU pre-accession assistance, with the balance expected from other European funds.
That envelope is intended to modernise the fleet, improve administration and inspection, develop aquaculture, strengthen processing and bring Montenegro closer to the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy. Seven of eight vessel-modernisation investments contracted under the MIDAS 2 programme had been completed by the time of the European Commission’s 2025 assessment, all involving new vessels shorter than 10 metres.
New vessels, however, cannot deliver their full economic benefit without port infrastructure. Public support that replaces an ageing boat but leaves its owner without a secure berth or regulated landing point produces an incomplete investment cycle. The capital asset is upgraded while the operating platform remains unchanged.
Montenegro made significant legislative progress in 2025, adopting new laws on marine fisheries, aquaculture, structural support and state aid. It also approved an action plan to strengthen administrative, inspection and control capacity.
That progress enabled Chapter 13 on fisheries and aquaculture to be provisionally closed in December 2025. Claims that Montenegro simply cannot close the chapter without first completing a fishing port are therefore no longer factually current. Provisional closure, however, does not remove the obligation to implement the legislation or establish credible operational controls before accession.
The European Commission had already identified staffing and enforcement as weak points. Montenegro was assessed as moderately prepared, with no increase in the number of fisheries inspectors or administrative personnel during the relevant reporting period. Its fisheries information system was still being upgraded, and inspectors required additional equipment and training.
A controlled port and landing system would make those limited resources more effective. Inspectors cannot efficiently monitor catches when boats unload at dispersed and partly informal locations. Concentrating landings at authorised points reduces the cost of checking logbooks, species, quantities, minimum sizes, gear restrictions and sanitary compliance.
It also strengthens the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Fish sold directly through restaurants or informal channels can be difficult to reconcile with vessel records. A first-sale and traceability system creates a documented chain from the fishing ground to the final buyer, protecting legitimate fishermen from operators who avoid licences, reporting and tax.
For Herceg Novi, the investment case should be based on a realistic service model rather than an oversized port conceived in isolation. The Bay of Kotor is spatially constrained and dominated by tourism, cruise traffic, recreational boating and environmental protections. Heavy industrial fishing activity would be difficult to reconcile with these uses.
A compact fishing hub at Meljine could instead focus on secure berths, safe landings, cold-chain services and premium local distribution. The city’s hotels and restaurants provide a natural customer base for traceable, locally caught seafood. The port could generate revenue through berth fees, ice, storage, handling, fuel, maintenance and market services while retaining regulated tariffs for professional fishermen.
Its operating company would need a clear structure. Direct municipal management may preserve public control but risks political staffing and weak commercial discipline. A private operator could improve efficiency but would require tightly defined service obligations and transparent tariffs. A producer co-operative could align management with fishermen’s needs, although it would probably need professional support in finance, food safety and logistics.
A hybrid arrangement would be more credible: state or municipal ownership of the infrastructure, a competitively selected specialist operator and a formal user council representing commercial fishermen, aquaculture producers, the municipality and food-safety authorities. Revenue and expenditure should be disclosed separately so that public-service berths are not gradually converted into higher-yield recreational moorings.
The first step does not require another political declaration or a new strategy. Morsko Dobro, the government, the Municipality of Herceg Novi and the relevant ministries need to reconstruct the contractual and physical record of the Lazure project. The review should identify what was promised, what was built, what entered state ownership, what remains under private control and what work is still required.
A technical survey could then determine whether the existing marina can accommodate a compliant fishing area without undermining navigation, hotel operations or environmental standards. Any remaining obligation should be costed, assigned and accompanied by a delivery schedule. A negotiated settlement may prove faster and less expensive than prolonged litigation, but it must preserve the value of the state’s contractual rights.
The fishing-port dispute has persisted because commercial marina development moved faster than the public institutions responsible for integrating fisheries, maritime transport, coastal management and local planning. Herceg Novi now has a high-quality tourism asset at Lazure, while fishermen continue to operate without the secure landing base that was supposed to accompany it.
Montenegro has already written fisheries modernisation into its EU laws and committed more than €26mn to the sector. Meljine is where that policy meets a physical quay, an enforceable contract and the daily economics of an ageing fleet. Until those elements are brought together, the country will continue financing boats that lack an operating base and importing fish for a tourism industry built beside an underused Adriatic resource.
