Corporación América Airports has reaffirmed its interest in operating Montenegro’s airports under a 30-year concession, extending its bank guarantee until August 2027 after the withdrawal of the previously preferred South Korean bidder, Incheon International Airport Corporation.
The extension keeps CAAP’s offer legally and commercially active, but it does not give the company an automatic right to the concession. Montenegro must now decide whether the existing tender permits negotiations with the second-ranked bidder, whether the remaining offer still represents market value, or whether the concession should be abandoned or relaunched.
That decision has become more difficult because the two airports are profitable, passenger traffic is growing and the state operator’s financial position is stronger than when the concession process began in 2019. The government is no longer choosing between immediate private investment and a stagnant public company. It is comparing a private concession with an increasingly credible state-financed development model.
CAAP said it had retained all security instruments required under the tender, including the renewed bank guarantee. The company described the extension as evidence that it remains ready to invest in Podgorica and Tivat airports and conclude a long-term partnership with the government.
A valid bid guarantee is meaningful because it prevents CAAP from walking away without potential financial consequences during the remaining validity period. It also gives the government time to clarify the tender’s legal status. It should not, however, be confused with committed financing for the complete investment programme. A bank guarantee secures obligations associated with the bid; it does not by itself demonstrate that all equity, project debt and construction financing required for the concession are available.
CAAP is now the only remaining bidder from the final tender stage. Incheon and CAAP submitted offers in May 2025 after a process that initially attracted interest from several established airport groups. The wider prequalification field had included India’s GMR Airports, the Groupe ADP–TAV Airports consortium, CAAP and Incheon, among others, but successive withdrawals left only two final offers.
The Tender Commission ultimately awarded Incheon 96.18 points, compared with 65.15 points for CAAP. In April 2026, the government accepted a proposal to move towards awarding the concession to the South Korean operator, although a final concession award was never completed.
Incheon formally withdrew on July 18, 2026, without publicly stating its reasons. Its departure removed the bidder that had received the strongest formal evaluation and left Montenegro with an offer that scored approximately 31 points lower.
That gap cannot be ignored simply because CAAP is still willing to proceed. The government must establish whether the scoring difference reflected substantive weaknesses in CAAP’s technical, operational or financial proposal, or whether it resulted from evaluation procedures that CAAP has disputed.
The tender has already been affected by resignations from the commission, allegations of unequal treatment, disagreements over technical scoring and litigation. CAAP previously challenged the procedure before the Administrative Court, arguing that changes in the evaluation approach had affected its position. It claimed that an earlier technical evaluation should have been treated as controlling and that this would have left CAAP as the leading bidder.
The company’s latest emphasis on legal certainty, equal treatment and adherence to established procedures should be read against that background. CAAP is expressing continued commercial interest while preserving the principle that any award must follow a legally defensible route.
For Montenegro, the immediate temptation will be to avoid another lengthy procurement and move directly to the remaining bidder. Yet the disappearance of competitive tension changes the economics of the process. A concession tender derives much of its credibility from comparison between competing offers. Once only one bidder remains, it becomes harder to prove that the state has secured the best available combination of investment, concession fees, service standards and risk transfer.
Moving to CAAP may still be legally possible, depending on the tender documents and Montenegrin concession law. The stronger question is whether the government can proceed without materially renegotiating the bid. Significant changes to tariffs, investment schedules, passenger assumptions, concession payments, employment obligations or risk allocation could create the impression that CAAP was receiving terms not available to the other tender participants.
A fully transparent legal opinion and updated financial assessment will therefore be essential. Montenegro’s advanced EU accession position raises the standard against which the process will be judged. Any award involving strategic infrastructure must withstand scrutiny concerning competition, equal treatment, public value and procedural consistency.
CAAP brings substantial operating experience. The New York-listed airport group manages 52 airports in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador, Armenia and Italy. Its airport portfolio handled approximately 86.7mn passengers in 2025, giving the company a scale far beyond that of Montenegro’s state operator.
The group’s experience spans mature European airports, fast-growing Latin American markets and long-term government concessions. It has demonstrated an appetite for large capital programmes, including a recently agreed framework in Armenia under which a new master plan is expected to include up to $425mn of investment through 2033.
Its reported Montenegrin proposal envisaged approximately €319mn of investment in Podgorica and Tivat airports—about €63mn more than the amount associated with Incheon’s competing offer. CAAP also proposed establishing bases for low-cost airlines, with one expected by 2029 and another by 2034.
Measured across the full 30-year concession, the headline investment commitment averages around €10.6mn annually. That simple average is not an adequate measure of value. Airport capacity investment must be concentrated in the early years, when terminal, runway, taxiway, apron, access, parking, security and baggage-handling constraints need to be addressed. Capital promised late in a concession has a substantially lower present value and contributes less to resolving current congestion.
The original CAAP schedule reportedly contemplated beginning construction in March 2026. That date has passed, meaning the investment programme can no longer be accepted without rebasing. The government would need an updated design and permitting schedule, revised construction prices, current passenger forecasts and a new financing plan.
Inflation since the original tender assumptions may have reduced the physical infrastructure that can be delivered for €319mn. Construction costs, equipment prices, interest rates and aviation-security requirements have changed during the prolonged procedure. A nominal investment commitment only retains its value when linked to a clearly defined scope, indexation rules and enforceable completion milestones.
The concession agreement would also need to distinguish between mandatory capital expenditure and discretionary commercial development. Investment in terminals, airside systems, safety and passenger capacity should not be treated as equivalent to hotels, retail facilities, car parks or surrounding real estate that primarily generates concessionaire revenue.
Montenegro’s negotiating position has strengthened because Aerodromi Crne Gore is profitable. The state-owned company ended 2025 with revenue of approximately €57.44mn, expenses of €29.4mn and profit of €15.24mn. Its 2026 plan projects revenue of €65.93mn, expenditure of €32.2mn and pre-tax profit of €15.67mn.
The company expects to allocate approximately €18.06mn to airline incentives and around €16.8mn to capital investment during 2026. Passenger traffic reached record levels in 2025, and the millionth passenger of 2026 was handled by mid-June, earlier than in any previous year. By June 21, Podgorica and Tivat had served almost 1.2mn passengers, while 21 new routes had been opened.
These results weaken the argument that a concession is needed to rescue an underperforming operator. The case for private operation must instead rest on the ability to finance larger investments faster, improve service quality, extend the operating season, attract based aircraft and transfer construction and traffic risks away from the state.
Aerodromi Crne Gore has been valued in recent official discussions at close to €265mn, although different historical assessments have produced lower figures. A company generating annual profit of more than €15mn is a significant state asset, particularly in a country with limited sources of recurring non-tax revenue.
The concession valuation cannot be reduced to a comparison between that corporate value and CAAP’s proposed €319mn investment programme. Capital expenditure would remain embedded in airport infrastructure and would be necessary under either public or private management. What matters to the state is the present value of upfront and annual concession fees, retained taxes and dividends, capital expenditure delivered, risks transferred, and the value of the assets returned at the end of the term.
Montenegro must also calculate the dividends and strategic control it would surrender. Continued state ownership could generate cumulative cash flows over three decades, but it would leave the government responsible for financing airport expansion and managing construction, procurement and airline-development risks. A concession could move part of that burden to CAAP, although the quality of the transfer depends entirely on contract drafting.
Weak concession agreements often socialise the downside while privatising the upside. Passenger declines may trigger tariff changes, contract extensions or compensation claims, while stronger-than-expected traffic can generate disproportionate private returns. Montenegro therefore needs clear provisions covering traffic risk, extraordinary events, tariff regulation, minimum service levels, capital-investment deadlines, performance deductions and termination compensation.
Tivat Airport presents the most immediate operational challenge. Its strong seasonal profile creates severe summer pressure but weaker winter utilisation, complicating the commercial case for major fixed investment. Expanding Tivat without a strategy for year-round traffic risks producing capacity that earns attractive returns only during part of the year.
Podgorica offers a more balanced platform for scheduled, business, diaspora and low-cost traffic. A based-aircraft strategy could increase winter connectivity and support tourism outside the peak season. However, airline bases normally require material incentive packages. The cost, duration and allocation of those incentives must be transparent, especially because the state operator already plans to spend €18.06mn supporting airline traffic in 2026.
Employment will be another sensitive issue. A private operator may improve productivity through automation, outsourcing and revised staffing. Those changes can reduce costs but also create political and labour opposition. Any agreement should specify employee protections, training obligations and transition arrangements without locking the airports into inefficient staffing structures for the entire concession.
The state’s alternative is no longer simply to wait. Years of uncertainty have constrained long-term investment planning at both airports. Maintaining public operation would require the government to approve a funded master plan, allow Aerodromi Crne Gore to undertake multi-year capital expenditure and strengthen professional governance. Rejection of the concession without an executable public-investment programme would prolong the capacity problem.
A new tender could restore competition and attract operators that withdrew earlier, particularly now that passenger traffic and profitability are stronger. It would also delay construction further and risk another cycle of legal and political disputes. International bidders would price the previous tender’s instability into their required returns and contractual protections.
Proceeding with CAAP offers a faster route only when the existing legal framework supports it and the bid remains financially and technically current. The renewed guarantee until August 2027 gives the government a defined window to complete that assessment, but it should not become another excuse for institutional delay.
The airport decision now carries implications beyond aviation. Montenegro has been trying to present itself as an increasingly predictable EU-aligned investment market. A transparent, evidence-based resolution would strengthen that position. An award perceived as improvised after the preferred bidder’s withdrawal would increase the political and regulatory risk premium attached to future concessions, energy projects and public-private partnerships.
CAAP’s continued interest preserves a credible private-sector option. It does not settle whether that option is superior to a new tender or strengthened public ownership. That conclusion must come from an updated concession valuation, a legally robust procurement path and an enforceable investment schedule capable of turning the €319mn headline commitment into airport capacity during the years when Montenegro actually needs it.
